Facts:
In 1994, Zabarte filed a complaint before the RTC against Puyat for the enforcement of a money judgement rendered by the Supreme Court California. In 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. The CA, in 1999, affirmed such ruling which then became final and executory on 2001.
In 2002, Petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the RTC. The writ remained not fully satisfied after 3 years, petition moved for the amendment of the writ. Petitioner filed a motion for examination of judgement obligor. Respondent argued that he, being a resident of Mandaluyong, cannot be compelled to appear at RTC Pasig. Later on, the parties were having settlement talks, leading to more hearing cancellations upon their mutual agreement. RTC ordered the case to be sent to the archives on 23 July 2008 in order not to unduly clog the court's docket.
On 2009, petitioner filed to revive with motion to resolve the pending motion to compel respondent to appear. RTC denied but issued alias writ and assigned it to Sheriff Boco. The sheriff garnished money from China bank and levied two condo parking lots under respondent’s wife name. Such however was sold by puyat to VGS properties.
A total of 73M from the monetary award remain unsatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion [for the Examination of the Judgment Obligor and Corporations where Defendant has Interest].In 2014, RTC ordered respondent to appear but denied the prayer for examination of the corpos listed then later on, in 2015, reversed its order and agreed that respondent cannot be compelled to appear before the RTC.
In 2017, Petitioner appealed. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. In addition, it held that although there were cases where the execution of a decision by motion was allowed to proceed beyond the five year period upon meritorious grounds, such liberality cannot be extended to petitioner as he himself caused the delay by insisting on a wrong course of action, despite already being told by the trial court that it cannot compel the respondent for examination.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the CA erred when It affirmed the RTC order dismissing the execution proceedings.
Ruling:
1. NO. In this case, the CA decision became final and executory on 2001. Petitioner had until 2006 to have it executed. He moved for its execution on 2002. There is no question, therefore, that the timing of the motion, and the consequent issuance of the Writ, were well within the five-year prescriptive period for execution by motion. For some reason, however, petitioner was not able to fully execute the Writ within the same five-year period.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is categorical that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry while Section 14, Rule 39 is clear that a writ of execution shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. Logically, since the life of a writ is only for five years, the winning party must be able to enforce the same during said period.
Since the enforcement of the Writ could not be completed within its lifetime, petitioner should have, as a rule, filed a complaint for the revival of judgment, in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court so but he did not. Perforce, the RTC would have been justified to terminate the proceedings below for being time-barred.
the issuance of a writ of execution by the court during the five-year period does not automatically give the winning party an extension of time to execute the same; neither does it authorize the winning party the right to enforce it sine die. The winning party must still observe the following time frames: 1) the issuance of writ of execution and levy must transpire within the five-year period for enforcement of judgment by motion; and 2) properties levied upon by execution must be sold at public auction within the period of 10 years during which the judgment can be enforced by action.
While petitioner was able to secure the Writ in a timely fashion, the sheriff could not levy sufficient properties of the respondent within the same five-year period. What is more, 14 years had already elapsed since entry of judgment, without the judgment being revived through an appropriate act10n. From these facts, it would appear that the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's dismissal of the proceedings.