Vhong Navarro vs Deniece Cornejo, GR 263329, February 28, 2023




Vhong Navarro vs Deniece Cornejo

GR 263329

Facts:

This case stemmed from three separate complaints filed by Cornejo against Navarro. First and second is for R*pe in relation to RA 9262 and the third one is for r*pe and attempted r*pe. All three complaints were dismissed for lack of probable cause. However, the CA reversed such dismissal.



The first complaint pertains to alleged incidents that happened on January 17 and 22, 2014 . Navarro countered such allegations stating that it was consensual and was forced to say out of fear that he r*ped Cornejo because a gun was pointed at him while he was being blindfolded. Navarro then filed a Serious Illegal Detention and grave coercion case against Cornejo.

In the second complaint, Cornejo reiterated her allegations on the first complaint but changed her story on what happened during January 22, 2014 saying that no rape happened on that date. The dismissal of the first two complaints by the DOJ were stemmed from her inconsistent testimonies during the alleged incident such as two different charges for r*pe on the same night, physical improbability, and inability to provide logical flow of the story.

As to the third complaint, she reiterated the incident on January 17 and 22, 2014 but this time she specifically named her friend Nina and introduced several other new happenings on those dates.

Navarro pointed out that several allegations on the third complaint were not found in her previous sworn statements. Navarro averred that Cornejo accused him of consummated R*pe in the First Complaint pertaining to the January 22, 2014 incident, only to revise the accusation to Attempted R*pe in the Third Complaint.

Cornejo attributed the inconsistencies in her First and Second Complaints to a miscommunication with her former counsel, Atty. Calleja. She averred that she was in a state of panic then and was not able to read the affidavits hurriedly prepared by Atty. Calleja.

Cornejo averred that she was only able to give a more thorough and detailed account of the January 17, 2014 and January 22, 2014 incidents in her Third Complaint when she was already out on bail and the social media bashing against her had already died down.

Cornejo argued that the inconsistencies in her previous complaint affidavits do not disprove her allegations that Navarro r*ped and attempted to r*pe her. She maintained that the questions relating to the credibility of her allegations is a matter of evidence that should be weighed by a judge in a full -blown trial.

The third complaint was dismissed. It stated the ascribing serious incredibility to Cornejo's allegations. Prosecutor Gafia found "no sufficient and convincing new or additional evidence" adduced by Cornejo in her Third Complaint.

Thereafter, Cornejo filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ. It was denied. She elevated the case to the CA citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the DOJ. The CA granted the petition. For the CA, the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation or defense, or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented. It added that issues relating to credibility should be adjudged during the trial proper.

In accordance with the pronouncements of the CA, the OCP Taguig filed the subject Information against Navarro on August 31, 2022 for R*pe and Acts of Lasciviousness. Navarro prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin both the MeTC Br. 16 and the RTC Br. 69 from proceeding with the cases for r*pe and acts of lasciviousness, respectively; and the DOJ and the OCP Taguig from further prosecuting the cases.


Issue:
whether the CA erred in finding that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the findings of Prosecutor Gafia and dismissing the Third Complaint against Navarro for lack of probable cause.


Ruling:

YES, the CA erred in finding that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the third Complaint for r*pe and attempted r*pe against Navarro for lack of probable cause.

The determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation for the purpose of filing an information is executive in nature, the correctness of which is a matter that the courts ordinarily do not, and may not be compelled to, pass upon. whether the evidence would rise or fall on its face is the sole prerogative of the public prosecutor to assess.

This judicial policy of non-interference is anchored on the inherently factual nature of the prosecutor's determination of probable cause, requiring the examination of the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [ or she] was prosecuted.

a preliminary investigation, albeit summary in nature, must be conducted in a scrupulous manner "to prevent material damage to a potential accused's constitutional right of liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play. A finding of probable cause requires "enough reason to believe that [the imputed crime] was committed by the accused. It is as effectively "a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case".

the prosecutor's findings of lack of probable cause against Navarro for the imputed crimes proceed from an adherence to the foregoing legal yardsticks, thus negating grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ in denying Comejo's petition for review. The prosecutor's findings appear to have been arrived at objectively. The prosecutor carefully, exhaustively, and deliberately evaluated the evidence on hand and the circumstances attending the case.

The noted inconsistencies in all three complaints reveal Comejo's highly deficient, unclear, and doubtful accounts of her purported harrowing experience in the hands of Navarro. The CA, however, faulted the prosecutor with error in relying on the inconsistencies, opining that these already touched on the issue of her
credibility.

It bears underscoring that in determining probable cause, "the average [person] weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he [or she] has no technical knowledge. He [or she] relies on common sense."

Here, the prosecutor had reasons to doubt the veracity of Comejo's accusations, as the glaring and manifest inconsistencies pointed out in her complaints are readily discernible by common sense without need of rigorous examination or an expertise of a trial court judge for such purpose.

It is the CA that disregarded such parameters when it substituted its own judgment
for that of the prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause against Navarro.

The DOJ's affirmance of the prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause was not arrived at in a "capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner" so as to oust the DOJ of jurisdiction. 

In the case, what Cornejo raised in her petition for certiorari before the CA are not errors of jurisdiction, but perceived errors in the prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause. Erroneous conclusions based on evidence, if at all, do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion

(Read the full text to see the enumeration of the inconsistent statements of Cornejo)


One example of her inconsistent statement:

In her First Complaint, Cornejo recalled that "[i}t was only by a miracle that [her] friends suddenly appeared to help [her]" and that, thereafter, she "suddenly felt the weight of [Navarro] taken away from [her].

Her friends purportedly effected a citizen's arrest upon the person of Navarro." 114 However, in her Third Complaint, Cornejo declared that her friends, Raz, et al., were already with her in her unit when Navarro called her on the phone that he wanted to drop by her unit purportedly to apologize for the January 17, 2014 incident.


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