Vhong Navarro vs Deniece Cornejo
GR 263329
Facts:
This case stemmed from three separate complaints filed by Cornejo against Navarro. First and second is for R*pe in relation to RA 9262 and the third one is for r*pe and attempted r*pe. All three complaints were dismissed for lack of probable cause. However, the CA reversed such dismissal.
Cornejo averred that she was only able to give a more thorough and detailed account of the January 17, 2014 and January 22, 2014 incidents in her Third Complaint when she was already out on bail and the social media bashing against her had already died down.
Issue:
Ruling:
YES, the CA erred in finding that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the third Complaint for r*pe and attempted r*pe against Navarro for lack of probable cause.
The determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation for the purpose of filing an information is executive in nature, the correctness of which is a matter that the courts ordinarily do not, and may not be compelled to, pass upon. whether the evidence would rise or fall on its face is the sole prerogative of the public prosecutor to assess.
This judicial policy of non-interference is anchored on the inherently factual nature of the prosecutor's determination of probable cause, requiring the examination of the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [ or she] was prosecuted.
a preliminary investigation, albeit summary in nature, must be conducted in a scrupulous manner "to prevent material damage to a potential accused's constitutional right of liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play. A finding of probable cause requires "enough reason to believe that [the imputed crime] was committed by the accused. It is as effectively "a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case".
the prosecutor's findings of lack of probable cause against Navarro for the imputed crimes proceed from an adherence to the foregoing legal yardsticks, thus negating grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ in denying Comejo's petition for review. The prosecutor's findings appear to have been arrived at objectively. The prosecutor carefully, exhaustively, and deliberately evaluated the evidence on hand and the circumstances attending the case.
The noted inconsistencies in all three complaints reveal Comejo's highly deficient, unclear, and doubtful accounts of her purported harrowing experience in the hands of Navarro. The CA, however, faulted the prosecutor with error in relying on the inconsistencies, opining that these already touched on the issue of her
credibility.
It bears underscoring that in determining probable cause, "the average [person] weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he [or she] has no technical knowledge. He [or she] relies on common sense."
Here, the prosecutor had reasons to doubt the veracity of Comejo's accusations, as the glaring and manifest inconsistencies pointed out in her complaints are readily discernible by common sense without need of rigorous examination or an expertise of a trial court judge for such purpose.
It is the CA that disregarded such parameters when it substituted its own judgment
for that of the prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause against Navarro.
The DOJ's affirmance of the prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause was not arrived at in a "capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner" so as to oust the DOJ of jurisdiction.
In the case, what Cornejo raised in her petition for certiorari before the CA are not errors of jurisdiction, but perceived errors in the prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause. Erroneous conclusions based on evidence, if at all, do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion
(Read the full text to see the enumeration of the inconsistent statements of Cornejo)
One example of her inconsistent statement:
In her First Complaint, Cornejo recalled that "[i}t was only by a miracle that [her] friends suddenly appeared to help [her]" and that, thereafter, she "suddenly felt the weight of [Navarro] taken away from [her].
Her friends purportedly effected a citizen's arrest upon the person of Navarro." 114 However, in her Third Complaint, Cornejo declared that her friends, Raz, et al., were already with her in her unit when Navarro called her on the phone that he wanted to drop by her unit purportedly to apologize for the January 17, 2014 incident.